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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
§78-2a-3(h), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellee takes issue with the issues presented by the Appellant. 
Specifically, Appellee disagrees that Issue No. 1 presented by the Appellant 
is an appropriate issue for the Court, as said Issue was not raised at the time 
of the Notice of Appeal nor in the Docketing Statement as required by Rule 
9 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Thus, the Appellee believes 
that the only issue on appeal is Issue No. 2 as presented in the Appellant's 
Statement of Issues Presented for Review. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellate Courts review jurisdictional issues under the " clearly 
erroneous" standard. Kamdar & Company v. Larav Company 815 P2d 245 
(Ut. App. 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24(6) (1998) 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not a 
citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any 
of the following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his 
personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to 
any claim arising out of or related to . . . 
(6) With respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or 
child support, having resided, in the marital relationship, within 
this state notwithstanding subsequent departure from the state; 
or the commission in this state of the act giving rise to the 
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claim, so long as that act is not a mere omission, failure to act, 
or occurrence over which the defendant had no control. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellee generally agrees with the nature of the case as set forth in 
Appellant's brief. 
2. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In addition to the Statement of Facts set forth by the Appellant, the 
Appellee sets forth the following additional facts: 
a. The parties had irreconcilable differences when they separated 
in January of 1989, and although they attempted to reconcile 
those differences when they visited each other, they were not 
able to do so. See Verified Complaint for Divorce, paragraph 
4, (R. at 2 and 3). Also see Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law in RE: Bifurcated Decree of Divorce; paragraph 5, (R. 
at 89). 
b. Mr. Lent did sign an affidavit indicating that he has not 
engaged in any extra-marital relationship within the state of 
Utah (R. at 57 and 58). 
c. Mr. Lent never resided with Mrs. Lent in a marital relationship 
except in the state of Idaho, although work/vacation-type trips 
did occur in the state of Utah. (R. at 15). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The irreconcilable differences of the parties existed at the time that 
Mrs. Lent separated from her husband in 1989 and moved herself to the 
state of Utah. Thus, such differences did not arise within the state of Utah. 
Additionally, Mrs. Lent's argument that Mr. Lent's alcohol consumption 
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was an irreconcilable difference that occurred within the state of Utah was 
objected to at the time of the final hearing, as that was the first time it had 
ever been raised in any of the pleadings or proceedings. 
The issue of whether the parties resided in the state of Utah in the 
marital relationship should not be heard by this Court as it was not 
preserved by Mrs. Lent in her notice of appeal nor in her docketing 
statement which required her to set forth the issues before this Court. 
However, the parties did not reside together in the marital relationship as 
contemplated by the statute. Their residence was the state of Idaho. 
Intermittent work and/or vacations into a neighboring state do not constitute 
"residing together" as the statute requires for the state of Utah to assume 
jurisdiction over an entire marital estate. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. There is only one issue raised in this appeal. 
Mrs. Lent filed a Docketing Statement dated September 22, 1998. In 
the Docketing Statement, Mrs. Lent raised one issue for review in this 
appeal. That issue was " Did the trial court err by ruling that Utah does not 
have jurisdiction over defendant where acts that created the irreconcilable 
differences that existed between the parties and which were relied on in 
granting the Decree of Divorce occurred in the state of Utah?" The 
Docketing Statement was filed pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and specifically Rule 9. Rule 9 of those rules requires that all 
issues presented by the appeal must be set forth with particularity and that 
general conclusions are not allowed. Mrs. Lent's issue in her Docketing 
Statement is a particular issue and is the issue on this appeal. 
However, in Mrs. Lent's brief she has now raised a second issue 
which relates to the parties residing in the marital estate together for 
3 
purposes of conferring jurisdiction on the Utah court over Mr. Lent, an 
Idaho resident. This issue should be not be heard as it was not raised in the 
Notice of Appeal or in the Docketing Statement, and was raised for the first 
time in Mrs. Lent's brief. This procedural deficiency should operate against 
Mrs. Lent and should not be considered by this Court. However, Mr. Lent 
will address that issue later in this brief, not as a waiver of the procedural 
deficiency, but to address the issue in the event this Court does waive that 
procedural deficiency. 
Point 2. Jurisdictional standards for asserting long-arm 
jurisdiction. 
Utah Courts have adopted a two-part inquiry in determining whether 
they can exercise personal jurisdiction over non-residents. See Kamdar & 
Company v. Laray Company 815 P2d 245 (Ut. App. 1991) and cases cited 
therein. First, claims against a non-resident must arise from the activities 
enumerated in Utah's long-arm statute, and second, the defendant's contacts 
must be sufficient to allow jurisdiction to be exercised without violation of 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
In related situations (not domestic) under the long-arm statute, courts 
have frequently stated that under the due process inquiry, a defendant's 
contacts with our state must be purposeful; that one avail himself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within our state; that he reasonably 
anticipated being hailed into court here; and that the maintenance of the suit 
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See 
Burt Drilling. Inc. v. Portadrill 608 P2d 244 (Utah 1980); Anderson v. 
American Society of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgeons 807 P2d 825 (Utah 
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1990), Parry v. Ernst Home Center Corporation 7 ?i P2cJ uW (I Hah 198Q); 
Kamdar & Company v. Larav Company 815 P2d 245 (Ut. App. 1991). 
These directives, when applied to the Lent's domestic situation, 
indicate that 1 liali b r i s lunsdiriinn ovn h 1i 1 cim However, to further 
justify such holding, a comment from Parry v. Ernst Home Center 
Corporation 779 P2d 659 (Utah 1989), is helpful. 
The United States Supreme Court stated that additional factors for 
inquiry include the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum 
state, and the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief. It must also 
"weigh in it's determination "the interstate judicial system's interest 
in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the 
shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental 
substantive social policies" Id. 729 P2d at 661. 
The Lent's married and lived in Idaho, their assets are there, their 
differences or inability to get along arose there Tin,"it, Mrs, I ent moveil out 
and came lo 1 'l.ih While Ihey Inecf a little bit to reconcile, it never worked. 
Therefore, these parties are divorced. Logic, common sense, and the law all 
support the action being done in Idaho, nol I l|,ih I he I Mali I kstn* ( I 'i tmi t 
was correct wini\\ it dismissed the complaint and concluded that as to Mr. 
Lent, there was not a sufficient basis to maintain personal jurisdiction over 
him in Utah. 
The Utah Com t held an evidentiary hearing regarding the issue of 
jurisdiction over Mr. Lent. Mrs. Lent had the burden of proving jurisdiction 
by a preponderance of the evidence. Kamdar & Company v. Laray 
Company K IS l\!d 24> ((It. App. 1991) Her facts do not reach that level of 
proof. The lower Court's conclusion that it did not have jurisdiction is not 
clearly erroneous, and should 
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Point 3. Irreconcilable differences existed at the time of the 
parties' separation in Idaho in 1989. 
Mrs. Lent argues that the irreconcilable differences existing between 
the parties occurred within the state of Utah. This argument is actually 
defeated by her own verified complaint and the final pleadings on the 
divorce which was granted. In her verified complaint, and particularly 
paragraph 4, she indicates that the parties did develop irreconcilable 
differences during their marriage. She admits that she separated in January 
of 1989 and moved from Idaho to Utah and that she and Mr. Lent did not 
live together as husband and wife thereafter. She indicated in her verified 
complaint that they made efforts to reconcile their differences by visiting 
each other after their separation in 1989, even though they maintained 
separate residences after their separation. Finally, she states that despite 
their efforts to reconcile, those irreconcilable differences remained. The 
final Findings of Fact are similar in content to the facts she alleged in her 
verified complaint. She now would ask this Court to hold that the 
irreconcilable differences were committed in this state, and thus confers 
upon Utah courts complete jurisdiction to handle the divorce matters. 
Under Utah law, irreconcilable differences are not fault-based. See 
Haumont v. Haumont 793 P2d 421 (Ut. App. 1990). This raises an issue as 
to what acts and whose acts created the irreconcilable differences, as it 
relates to Utah's long-arm statute in U.C.A. §78-27-24(6). It is apparent 
from Mrs. Lent's pleadings that she had irreconcilable differences with her 
husband prior to her separation in January of 1989. At the final hearing 
when the Decree of Divorce was granted, she then, for the first time, 
testified that Mr. Lent had consumed alcohol within the state of Utah since 
their separation and that that was one of the issues that she had for 
6 
irreconcilable-differences (h i testimony svns oh|< t ted to on the basis that it 
was the first time in the history of the case that she had raised alcohol as an 
issue for the divorce. The issue of alcohol consumption was raised for 
first time at the hearing when Mr 1 uil w.b, r I hi \ i I .ind could not 
defend himself. Furthermore, per her own Verified Complaint, she already 
had irreconcilable differences before she ever resided in the stat Ml 
Thus, Mr. Lent's alcohol umsumplinn in llie slale '' f Utah, after separation, 
while it may have kept the parties from reconciling, was not a cause of their 
irreconcilable differences, which already existed prior thereto ' • - ; i 
testimony concerning Ilk iilcohohsni and counsel's objection to the same is 
found in the transcript pages 13 -17. 
It is noted that in these proceedings, Mr. i cm iielual I \ 11 lei i h> o 
motions to dismiss which were heard by the Court. At the first hearing, the 
Court denied the motion to dismiss on the basic presumption that Mrs. Lent 
had raised the issue of infidelity within i , - .. the 
(11 \ I >?v i' A11: o 111»11 s 111 was not raised in the first motion to dismiss, nor even 
in the pleadings filed in the second motion to dismiss. 
• • •- • Mrs. Lent did raise an issue ol mtidelit; v\ ilhin the state ol Utah. Mi 
Lent specifically refuted her allegations and stated that he did not engage in 
any extra-marital affair within the state of Utah ever. Mrs. Lent finally 
admitted that she could no I pioM iii\ mtidehh in Mir state ol 1 Itah She 
makes hearsay statements concerning a birth certificate, which she 
acknowledges she could not find. Based upon Mrs. Lent's own admission 
that she could not prove an \ infujelih, in the shite nl I Mali, there is no basis 
to conclude or determine that an act of infidelity occurred within the state of 
Utah giving her grounds for divorce within this state, ii is also n. < I 
the infidelity issue that if nitleeU n IKH) oa unvd outside of Utah, and was 
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used by Mrs. Lent as a grounds for her irreconcilable differences that it, too, 
existed at the time the parties separated in 1989, and cannot be used to 
confer jurisdiction over Mr. Lent, in the Utah Court. 
It is also interesting to note that Mrs. Lent's allegation of infidelity 
occurred approximately 35 years ago when the parties were both admittedly 
living in the state of Idaho. See record at page 72. It is incongruous with 
the principles of personal jurisdiction to allege an act occurring 35 years ago 
as the basis for conferring jurisdiction in this state, when after that act, the 
parties lived together in the state of Idaho for at least an additional 25 years. 
It should not be the place of Utah Courts to allow a party to sit upon an 
alleged act for 25 years, move to a neighboring state, and then attempt to 
use that act as giving rise to personal jurisdiction in the neighboring state, 
being Utah. 
Point 4. The parties did not reside together in Utah. 
The parties did not reside in the state of Utah in the marital 
relationship. This issue was not preserved in this appeal and should not be 
heard by this Court. However, the argument is very simple to establish. 
The provisions of Utah's long-arm statute as it relates to divorce and found 
in Utah Code Annotated §78-27-24(6) were designed to confer jurisdiction 
on this Court for parties who actually live in or have lived in this state 
together. 
If we were to accept Mrs. Lent's argument, then any couple who has 
ever been to the state of Utah could later come back, establish their three 
month residency, and invoke the jurisdiction of the Court for a divorce. A 
couple's contacts with the state could be in the nature of work, temporary 
work, as Mr. Lent has done, for vacations as many people travel, 
conventions which our state or it's entities host, or any other number of 
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draws that the state • •. ^ . \ . c i: ng together. Under Mrs. 
Lent's theory, as soon as a man and wife cross the Utah border, they are 
residing in our state in the marital relationship. That term should n 
construed so broadly II slumM moie uattnali\ be construed in its logical 
sense, and that is in conjunction with an actual residency. It should mean an 
intent upon those parties' parts to live and make Utah their home togetu 
and signify something more Ih.ir 11M temporary transient situations which 
temporary work, conventions, and vacations portray. This is especially true 
in the Lent's situation where they openly admit th-n ihnr residence was in 
Bannock Coiini) „ stale of Idaho, and has been for not just a few years, but 
for, in essence, their entire marital relationship which lasted some 44 years. 
It is urged that this Court accept ihe term mi irsideil vi iihni the . 
marital relationship" as provided in the long-arm statute to have a similar 
meaning, at least as to the time element, as that found in the jurisdictional 
requirements of Utah Code Annotated § \\) \ 111) I i n purposes < >f 
jurisdiction, the parties should have at least resided in Utah together with an 
intent to make this their home for the requisite period of time. Thereafter, if 
they choose to move and establis \ *'*e? < ** < • * .. „ later 
separate, and one or the other move back to Utah, then it would be 
appropriate for Utah courts to then assert personal jurisdiction over both of 
the parties. To define residence as nieaiiitie less than llns simply opens the 
dooi to an abuse of the jurisdictional requirements of the Utah court system 
and to an abuse of legal due process. 
While the term residence can :tii<I has taken di I lerent meanings in 
different situations, it is urged that this Court take the provisions of Title 30 
and actual bona fide residence for jurisdictional purposes, combine that \v 1111 
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the long-arm statute and the provisions of residing within this state, and 
harmonize them to require not just transitory situations in Utah, but some 
type of permanent intent upon the parties to stay here and make this state 
both their homes before asserting jurisdiction in a divorce situation. 
It is only logical that Idaho handle the divorce issues between these 
parties where they resided for over 35 years together before Mrs. Lent 
decided to separate from Mr. Lent, and then unilaterally moved to the state 
of Utah and made this her permanent home. Mrs. Lent's reliance upon the 
Ohio case added in their brief, I believe, is distinguishable simply because it 
is a Uresa action for support, and not an initial divorce action with the very 
basic provisions of the divorce itself. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court was correct in dismissing the plaintiffs complaint 
for lack of jurisdiction. The alleged acts giving rise to irreconcilable 
differences already existed prior to Mrs. Lent's move to Utah and/or she 
could not prove that they even arose within the state of Utah. Thus, the 
Utah court does not have jurisdiction over Mr. Lent for acts arising without 
the state of Utah leading to irreconcilable differences. Mr. Lent did not 
reside in the marital relationship within the state of Utah. These parties 
were Idaho residents, and indeed, long-time Idaho residents. His temporary 
work in Utah, and Mrs. Lent's visiting him here in a vacation situation does 
not rise to the level of residing within the state of Utah for the purposes of 
conferring jurisdiction on our Court system. 
The District Court was correct in dismissing Mrs. Lent's complaint 
10 
for lack of personal jurisdiction over Mr. Lent. That decision was nol 
clearly erroneous, and it should be affirmed on this appeal. 
DATED this b^ day of 4-judr , 1999. 
P4J0fiA§k 
^LaMar J Win^ard 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
I, LaMar J Winward, certify that on /h^H ^*> , 1999,1 served two 
copies of the attached Brief of Appellee upon G. Michael Westfall, 
the counsel for the Appellant in this matter, by mailing it to him by 
first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following 
address: 
Mr. G. Michael Westfall 
59 South 100 East 
St. George, UT 84770 
Attorney of Rj 
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